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In the euro area, responsibility incumbent upon central banks in terms of financial stability is
mainly exercised at the national level.
Indeed, it would have only been justified to assign the European Central Bank (ECB) a key role in
the maintenance of financial stability if the creation of the euro area was likely to increase systemic
risk. In fact, the setting up of Target, with the granting of fully collateralised intraday credits in the
real-time gross settlement systems operated by central banks, has led to a reduction in systemic risk.
Furthermore, several factors, either of a macroeconomic nature (the single monetary policy, the
disappearance of exchange-rate crises and improved fiscal discipline), or a technical nature (increased
liquidity and the replacement of unsecured loans by repos) have come together to strengthen financial
market stability. Lastly, in the banking sector, credit institutions have capitalised on several years of
robust economic growth to increase their financial soundness. Banking mergers have generally
taken place at the national level and cross-border lending has remained meagre, limiting risks of
contagion in the euro area as a whole.
In any case, the Eurosystem has ways of preventing and efficiently managing systemic crisis, should
it arise. Target is protected against the risk of “seizing up” thanks to broad eligible collateral
requirements, and against the risk of intraday credit payment default — notably by participants
from “pre-in” countries — thanks to dissuasive measures. The Eurosystem constantly monitors
financial markets and, as it demonstrated in the wake of the events of the September 2001, has
efficient and rapid means of assuaging the market pressures that could be passed on to banking
liquidity, the only type of liquidity the Eurosystem steers. In addition, as central banks pay heed to
financial market distortions only because they may impair the stability of prices of goods and
services and affect financial stability, it would be unwarranted for the ECB to take account of asset
prices in its conduct of monetary policy. Lastly, close international co-operation between banking
supervisors and the advantages inherent in combining monetary policymaking with banking
supervision at the national level prove that the Eurosystem’s institutional supervisory arrangements,
in which national central banks play a primary role, are appropriate. In this regard, the organisation
of the provision of emergency liquidity to institutions has not changed fundamentally since the
changeover to the euro, as mechanisms for the rapid transmission of information to the ECB make
it possible to deal with the impact that these operations have in terms of liquidity.60 FSR • The Eurosystem, the euro area and financial stability  • November 2002
1| Does the creation of the euro area increase
systemic risk?
1|1 Payment systems
In order to ensure a single interest rate level on the
shortest maturities within Monetary Union, the
Eurosystem had to provide a settlement instrument
that guaranteed an effective arbitrage between euro
area financial centres. At the same time, NCBs
implemented a risk reduction programme in the
framework of the Single Market, which involved
setting up real time gross settlement systems (RTGS)
and systems to facilitate cross-border payments.  As
a result, Target (Trans European Automated Real
time Gross settlement Express Transfer) was
launched in early 1999. It comprises the 15 European
Union RTGS systems (TBF in France) and the ECB’s
payment mechanism. In order to ensure settlement
finality during the day, the ESCB grants intraday
liquidity to Target participants but, in exchange, it
requires that these credits be fully collateralised. This
eliminates almost all systemic risk in Target: the
residual systemic risk stems from the risk of technical
default, which, by nature, cannot be completely
removed, and from the risk of an insufficient level
of collateral at the participants’ disposal. The pool of
collateral is broad enough so as not to favour one
category of issuer or institution over another:  it
amounts to approximately EUR 5,700 billion, of which
around one third is held by credit institutions.
Overall, the probability of a creditworthy institution
that participates in Target becoming illiquid and
having to default at the end of the day may be deemed
to be zero. Might it have been possible to enhance
the prevention of systemic risk, without significantly
increasing participants’ obligations, by adopting a
different intraday credit policy (Furfine and Stehm,
1998)?  The Fed grants intraday loans in Fedwire
but does not require them to be collateralised.
However, it seeks to discourage participants from
using these loans by means of  minute-based pricing
(incidentally at the very low rate of 0.25% per year),
and in particular by setting limits. It is likely that,
for participants in Fedwire, these constraints are just
as restrictive as the eligible collateral requirement
in Target.
C
entral banks have become increasingly
concerned about financial stability (Patat,
2000).  Indeed, monetary policy is only fully
effective if it is based on predictable transmission
mechanisms, and this requires the financial
environment to be sufficiently stable.  Moreover, price
stability, which is the final objective of monetary
policy, is a prerequisite but not a guarantee of
financial stability, as unforeseeable or external
shocks may occur (e.g. the Asian crisis of summer
1997, the Russian crisis of August 1998, the terrorist
attacks of September 2001), and given that banking
systems and financial markets both have specific
dynamics. Lastly, financial instability, and in
particular banking instability, may carry major
macroeconomic costs (Hoggarth and al., 2002).
In this context, the limited role played by the
European Central Bank (ECB) in drawing up and
implementing prudential policies in the euro area
and in the European Union (EU) has given rise to
some concern. The absence of a Community
institution to carry out all of these tasks has also
raised questions (Aglietta, 2000; Aglietta and al.,
2000; Begg and al., 1998; Lanoo, 1999; Plihon, 2000;
Prati and Schinasi, 1999).  Although the Maastricht
Treaty mentions that one of the main tasks of the
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), alongside
the definition and implementation of monetary policy,
is to promote the smooth running of payment
systems, it only states that the “ESCB shall contribute
to the proper conduct of policies pursued by the
competent authorities relating to the prudential
supervision of credit institutions and the stability of
the financial system” (article 105(5) of the Treaty).
The ECB must also be consulted on all draft
regulations at the Community or national level in
its field of competence (Article 105(4) of the Treaty),
including that mentioned in Article 105(5).
Furthermore, while European institutions play a key
role in drawing up prudential regulations, national
authorities are, to a large extent, responsible for
prudential supervision and financial stability.
Two questions arise: does the creation of the euro
area increase systemic risk? And does the
Eurosystem have the means to prevent and
effectively manage a potential systemic crisis?  Three
channels of possible contagion have been identified:
payment systems, financial markets and banks (De
Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). We shall consider these
two questions for each of these three channels.FSR • The Eurosystem, the euro area and financial stability  • November 2002 61
At the same time as Target was set up, the European
Banking Association (EBA) switched from an ECU
clearing system to a cross-border settlement system
(Euro 1) that, like Target, handles same-day value
transactions in euro within the EU. Euro 1 is an
end-of-day central bank money net settlement system
which is open to EBA members, i.e. the largest
European credit institutions. In accordance with the
“Lamfalussy standards”, each member is subject to a
double requirement aimed at containing systemic
risk: first, a multilateral debit and credit limit, i.e.
vis-à-vis all other participants, is imposed throughout
the day; second, each member contributes to a cash
deposit account amounting to EUR 1 billion, which,
in the event of the participant with the highest
exposure limit defaulting, can be used to settle its
transactions at the end of the day. This interest-bearing
deposit account is held by the EBA at the ECB, which
acts as settlement agent for Euro 1.
Contrary to what is sometimes feared, Target, which
is the most secure system, has from the outset
accounted for the largest share of transfers, in
particular cross-border and large-value transfers.
These transfers entail a priori the greatest systemic
risk, but are also the most likely to contribute to market
integration. Over the first four months of 1999, 69%
of the daily value of all transactions (amounting to
EUR 1,400 billion) was attributable to Target, while
the NCBs’ RTGSs accounted for only 50% in 1998 —
with the unit value of transactions amounting to twice
that registered in net settlement systems, and even
four times greater for cross-border transactions (Beau
and Ducher, 1999). In 2001, the corresponding figures
were EUR 1,299 billion as a yearly average and a 74%
market share for Target. By comparison, with a daily
value of transactions close to that processed by Target
(i.e. approximately USD 1,000 billion), Fedwire
represents approximately 45% of payment amounts
with an average unit value below that of its competitor
Chips.
1|2 Financial markets
The introduction of the euro was generally expected
to increase the integration and capacity of financial
markets by eliminating foreign exchange risk,
homogenising public debt management methods and
broadening the investor base (Mc Cauley and White
1997; Von Thadden, 2001). As a result of the decline
in transactions by general government, which had to
comply with the fiscal sustainability criteria laid down
in the Maastricht Treaty, financial markets have
become increasingly attractive to private issuers,
especially given that the growing role played by
institutional investors (pension funds, insurance
companies, etc.) has increased the size and liquidity
of markets. Indeed, the number and size of issues on
private bond markets have grown substantially and
there has been an increase in the diversity of issuers.
It is difficult, however, to draw definite conclusions
for the future insofar as the bulk of these issues
occurred in a period of strong economic growth,
during which issuers may have sought to strengthen
their position on a new market.
The greatest integration was seen on the money
market. In particular, Target made a significant
contribution to the integration of the interbank
deposit market, with 98% of amounts exchanged in
Target being interbank transfers. As a result, the
difference in Eonia (Euro Overnight Index Average)
rates across markets fell from 15 basis points in
January 1999 to 5 basis points in February 1999, and
subsequently to between 1 to 3 basis points.  Unlike
in the deposit market, integration of the repo market
did not occur from the outset; it was nevertheless
bolstered by the growing number of links between
euro area securities settlement systems, the
development of cross-border transactions and the use
of securities repurchase agreements in the
Eurosystem’s open-market operations:  for example,
on the general collateral repo market, the average
spread between repo rates on French and Belgian
government securities declined from 5 basis points
in 1999 to 3 basis points in 2002 (Financial Markets
Directorate, 2001).
Overall, as the economic environment improves —
implementation of a single monetary policy,
disappearance of exchange rate crises, improved
fiscal discipline, etc. —, as unsecured loans are
gradually replaced by repos, which are less costly
in terms of own funds, and as market liquidity
increases, systemic risk is expected to have declined
on euro area financial markets.
1|3 Banks
When the euro area was created, member countries’
banking systems were characterised by the
following:  a level of profitability that remained
unsatisfactory, especially compared to Anglo-Saxon
banks; apparently less competition between small
institutions as compared to the United States;
relatively little international business, with the great
majority of customer transactions being carried out
with residents and a limited number of subsidiaries
established in other euro area countries; little
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were underway and lastly, relatively heterogeneous
business activities, structures and legal frameworks,
in spite of the significant progress achieved since the
early 1980s with the implementation of Community
directives on banking co-ordination (ECB, 1999 a ; De
Bandt and Davis, 2000 ; Padoa-Schioppa, 1999 ; White,
1998).
In this context, the introduction of the euro should act
as a catalyst for the forces liberalised by the single
financial services market and lead in turn to greater
internationalisation, the homogenisation of activities
and enhanced competition . Yet, most of the recent
mergers in the banking sector appear to have been
part of an overall strategy aimed at strengthening
positions on national markets (ECB, 2000 a). In
addition, in 2001, the level of cross-border lending was
still relatively small (around 11% of total lending of
the euro area banks to non-bank clients) (ECB, 2002 b).
Furthermore, banks have generally taken advantage
of the strong economic growth that the euro area
countries experienced from 1998 to 2000 to consolidate
their financial soundness; the narrowing of banks’
lending margins does not provide clear evidence of
cut-throat competition which would be liable to
undermine risk-based pricing (ECB, 2000 b). The euro
area banking sector remained robust despite a number
of adverse developments in 2001. Banks’ solvency ratios
remained by and large unaffected, and banks had
significantly provisioned against the risks that
materialised in 2001 (ECB, 2002 b). In the longer run,
increased competition could nevertheless result in the
narrowing of banks’ margins. Moreover the
development of cross-border bank cash management
operations should reinforce the interdependence
between euro area institutions — even if these
operations are generally carried out within a same
group — and could therefore heighten the risk of
contagion.
Lastly, it appears that the creation of the euro area is
likely to have led to a lasting reduction in systemic risk
in payment systems while its impact on banking stability
may be equivocal only in the long term. Overall, it is
therefore impossible to infer that there has been an
increase in systemic risk.
2| Does the Eurosystem have the means to prevent
and effectively manage a potential systemic crisis?
2|1 Payment systems
Theoretically, the provision by the Eurosystem of
intraday liquidity against collateral to Target
participants could give rise to two types of risk.
First, the system may grind to a halt if the pool of
eligible collateral is insufficient, which is not the case
as we explained above.
Second, if participants are unable to reimburse their
intraday overdrafts, central bank money created
throughout the day is not destroyed before the end
of the day, thus raising the end-of-day level of the
monetary base. Intraday credit is said to spill over
into overnight credit. As the central bank is, in a
way, presented with a fait accompli, this spillover is
sanctioned: extending an intraday credit into an
overnight credit is treated as a request for access to
the Eurosystem’s marginal lending facility, which is
drawn at a penalty rate compared to the overnight
rate (ECB, 1999 b)1. Furthermore, as Target is open
to the fifteen EU members, any spillover at the end
of the day from participants of “pre-in” countries had
to be prevented because no central banks grant
refinancing to non-residents. A number of measures
to prevent this were adopted in summer 1998. They
include an overall ceiling on intraday liquidity that
each “pre-in” NCB may grant to participants in its
RTGS (EUR 3 billion in the case of the Bank of
England, EUR 1 billion for the other two “pre-in”
NCBs), an early liquidity deadline compared with
that applied to euro area residents, and a penalty
rate at least five percentage points above that of the
marginal lending facility if the intraday credit is not
repaid before the close of business of Target. All these
measures contribute to reducing the number of
spillovers at the end of the day, especially by
participants from “pre-in” countries.
2|2 Financial Markets
In view of the expansion of euro area financial
markets, it seems appropriate that the Eurosystem
monitor these markets’ liquidity levels, or even
maintain them by adjusting the level of banking
liquidity, i.e. reserves held by banks, which is the
1 The collateral eligible for the marginal lending facility is the same as that accepted for the provision of intraday liquidity.FSR • The Eurosystem, the euro area and financial stability  • November 2002 63
only liquidity it steers. In addition, recent concerns
about the importance of asset prices in the conduct
of monetary policy have raised questions as to whether
central banks should be responsible for stabilising
them (Artus, 2000 ; Bernanke and Gertler, 2000 ;
Cecchetti and al., 2000). These three areas are
examined below.
The monitoring of financial markets provides a
number of indicators that measure the market’s state
of nervousness:  trading volumes; perception of
market risks, reflected by implied volatility levels;
liquidity premiums displayed in the spread between
bid and ask prices or the difference between
yield-to-maturity of “on” and “off-the-run” government
securities, i.e. the most recent issue and the previous
one with the same maturity; assessment of credit
risk through the prices of securities issued by private
borrowers, such as banks and companies, and their
yield spread against government securities in the case
of debt securities. These indicators are available for
the euro area, and they should provide an increasing
amount of information as private issuance expands.
In addition, the Eurosystem is kept permanently
informed of the developments on financial markets
via its various structures. A “market monitoring
group”, which brings together a number of Eurosystem
officials, holds a weekly teleconference on market
developments and more structural issues.
Furthermore, the Eurosystem’s specialised
committees — the International Relations Committee
and the Market Operations Committee — meet once
a month to study market-related data, as well as other
economic and monetary data. The ECB Governing
Council also discusses these issues at its monthly
meeting, and may also organise ad hoc
teleconferences.
Two instruments of the single monetary policy may
be of particular relevance for easing market pressure,
which could otherwise have adverse repercussions
on banking liquidity 2. Minimum reserves, calculated
as an average over a one-month period, are by nature
a liquidity buffer, except during the last days of the
maintenance period. The second instrument is the
marginal lending facility, which is used in
end-of-day bank liquidity management, as previously
mentioned. The advantage of these instruments is
that they can be triggered by counterparties, thus
contributing to the self-regulation of the very
short-term money market. In the event of a minor
crisis, they prevent the Eurosystem from having to
intervene on its own initiative, thereby limiting the
risk of moral hazard, as liquidity is provided under
conditions close to “Bagehot rules” (Bagehot, 1873),
i.e. to the whole market, at a pre-specified penalty
rate and against appropriate assets. In the event of a
more severe crisis, or if the Eurosystem wishes to act
pre-emptively, it may also carry out market operations
in accordance with flexible procedures that can be
rapidly implemented. This system proved its flexibility
following the events of 11 September 2001: liquidity
requirements were first met rapidly, without exerting
any pressure on interest rates; liquidity was then
absorbed within a few days, again without disrupting
the money market.
Does the ongoing expansion of euro area financial
markets justify enlarging the ECB’s primary objective
of price stability to include financial asset prices,
beyond merely taking account of their information
content and their role in the transmission
mechanism?  From an institutional point of view,
this would probably call for a change in the statutes
of the Eurosystem’s central banks, insofar as the
Maastricht Treaty does not explicitly refer to asset
prices, and the legislators were probably only
targeting consumer goods prices — flows — when
they defined the single monetary policy’s price
stability objective; the only asset price mentioned in
the Treaty is the exchange rate, which is the joint
responsibility of the ECB and the Community’s
executive power. From an analytical point of view,
the central bank would be faced with two problems:
measuring the aggregated index (possibly aggregating
asset prices with prices of flows), and setting a
reference level, even though the fundamental value
of assets is generally subject to a high degree of
uncertainty. From a strategic point of view, if the
central bank intervened to smooth asset prices, for
example by lowering key interest rates if prices were
deemed to be persistently undervalued, this could
create a risk of moral hazard and be destabilising if
investors perceived it to be a guarantee,  and could
in turn encourage excessive risk-taking. Central bank
intervention could even prove ineffective given the
uncertainty about the relationship between
short-term interest rate variations and asset price
variations: a fall in key rates could aggravate the initial
situation if it contributed to monetary policy losing
its credibility. Conversely, a rise in key rates may
not initially impact asset prices, but might
2 In particular, these repercussions occur in two instances where the sharp fall in prices prompts fears about the creditworthiness of institutions. The
first instance is one in  which the amount relating to positions still open at the end of the day, between market participants, rises very sharply
without a corresponding increase in interbank loans, because institutions lack confidence in their counterparties. And the second is in the event of
a banking panic where depositors request en masse that their deposits be converted into banknotes; the loss of confidence therefore directly
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subsequently cause them to plummet following
repeated intervention, should they vary in the event
of non-linearity, as is frequently the case. Lastly, the
objective of asset price stability could, at times, be at
odds with that of prices of flows of goods and services.
Besides, it has been demonstrated that a policy of
actively targeting asset prices could lead to greater
variations, not only in the latter, but also in output
and prices of flows, than a pro-active and precautionary
policy of targeting inflation expectations (Bernanke
and Gertler, 2000).
It has admittedly been argued that central banks could
reduce the volatility of inflation and output by reacting
to inflation forecasts and to asset price
“misalignments” (Cecchetti and al., 2000).  However,
this is not tantamount to advocating the direct
targeting of asset prices, with the associated
operational problems that this would entail.
Lastly, central banks are not focusing on financial
market misalignments in order to take account of
asset prices in their conduct of monetary policy, but
rather because these distortions could impair the
stability of prices of flows of goods and services and
affect financial stability (Trichet, 2002).
2|3 Banks
Two areas have been called into question with respect
to the Eurosystem’s ability to cope with a systemic
crisis in the banking sector: institutional arrangements
for banking supervision, and operations carried out as
part of the bank’s role as lender of last resort, i.e. the
provision of emergency liquidity to individual
institutions, in general banks.
As regards the first point, banking supervision is
currently performed at the national  level and, in most
countries, by NCBs or in close co-operation with them,
as is the case in France (Commission bancaire — General
Secretariat, 1999). This decentralised approach is
generally deemed to be well suited to the current
situation of limited cross-border activity (Lanoo, 1999)
as it “allows the efficient use of information that may
not be available far from the market on which the
bank operates” (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). Furthermore,
supervisors have been co-operating to ensure that
transnational groups and conglomerates in particular
are efficiently supervised 3. This co-operation exists at
two levels. Bilaterally: memoranda of understanding,
drawn up within a common framework, were signed
between European supervisory authorities to carry out
the supervision of branches — by the home country —
and the double supervision by the host country and
the home country for subsidiaries established in
countries other than their home country. And
multilaterally: for a long time, European supervisors
have been co-operating via the “Contact Group” in the
presence of a representative of the European
Commission, and more recently via the Banking
Supervision Committee (BSC) of the ESCB, whose work
is examined by the Governing Council. This
co-operation contributes to the tasks provided for in
Articles 105 (4) and 105 (5) of the Treaty. Moreover,
supervisors can provide the Eurosystem with the
necessary information, via the BSC, in the event of a
banking crisis, mirroring previously-existing provisions
in the different countries.
Experience shows, in addition, that allocating the dual
functions of monetary policy and banking supervision
to central banks has led to a decline in bank failures
and a lesser demand on taxpayers (Goodhart and
Schoenmaker, 1995). Indeed, this combination of duties
has specific advantages in terms of systemic stability:
information collected by the central bank in the course
of its oversight of payment systems and the money
market helps to detect bank liquidity problems, and
the availability of prudential information enables central
banks to intervene more quickly and to better control
the risk of moral hazard associated with the possible
provision of liquidity as part of their lender of last resort
function. In addition, it has been shown that the
availability of confidential information, collected during
banking supervision operations, in particular on largest
institutions, enabled the Federal Reserve System to
improve the efficiency of its monetary policy (Peek and
al., 1999). In view of the complementary nature of
monetary policy and banking supervision, it would
appear logical that NCBs take on the duty of banking
supervision where this is not already the case. Further,
the ECB is in favour of assigning to BCNs
responsibilities that extend beyond the banking
system, as systemic concerns may sometimes arise
from the existence of major organisations active in
several sectors (ECB, 2001 ; Padoa-Schioppa, 2002).
The organisation of lender of last resort operations
has only been marginally changed by the
introduction of the euro. In fact, both the terms of
provision of liquidity in Target and the
development of deep and liquid financial markets
3 For a description of  co-operation in terms of prudential supervision at the international and  EU levels, see European Central Bank (2002 a).FSR • The Eurosystem, the euro area and financial stability  • November 2002 65
— and the foreseen expansion of private guarantee
funds and the possible development of liquidity
pools (Aglietta, 2000) — should reduce instances of
creditworthy institutions becoming illiquid. The
trend observed over the past ten years bears witness
to this (Commission bancaire — General Secretariat,
1999). If however a creditworthy institution were
to become illiquid and generate a systemic risk, with
no possible private solution engineered by the
authorities, “the clear response is that euro area
authorities would have the necessary capacity to
act” (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999). Indeed, within the
Eurosystem there are provisions for “emergency
liquidity assistance and their associated costs to
be covered by the national authorities” (Commission
bancaire — General Secretariat, 1999). It is not
difficult to identify these costs as “any supervised
institution has an unambiguously identified
supervisor and NCB” (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999).  In
view of the level of minimum reserves in the euro
area (around EUR 130 billion) and their role in
absorbing liquidity shocks in the banking system,
only a very large provision of emergency liquidity
could interfere with the implementation of the
single monetary policy: the volume of lender of last
resort operations that may require “sterilisation” —
i.e. the destruction by the central bank of the liquidity
created, for instance through liquidity absorbing
operations — is therefore much greater than before
the creation of the euro area. Whatever the case,
rapid information transmission mechanisms are
now in place between the ECB and the NCBs “in
order to manage the impact on liquidity of such
operations and to assess their possible implications
in terms of monetary policy in the euro area”
(Commission bancaire — General Secretariat, 1999).
It appears that the creation of the euro area has not contributed to increasing systemic risk and that
the Eurosystem has the means to prevent and manage a potential financial crisis. In particular, it
has the capacity to provide the liquidity necessary for participants in payment systems and for
temporarily illiquid institutions whose failure could be a source of systemic risk. Nonetheless EMU
may ultimately result in a change in the structure of the financial sector characterised by the
development of vast capital markets and the creation of pan-European banking groups. In view of
these possible developments, the Eurosystem and supervisors must remain vigilant. The first Brouwer
Report in fact concluded that the current European regulatory and supervisory framework provided
a consistent and flexible basis for maintaining financial stability, while recommending that its
practical functioning be strengthened (Economic and Financial Committee, 2000). In addition, the
second Brouwer Report called for a strengthening of cross-border co-operation in financial crisis
management, and in particular, for the exchange of information procedures to be decided on in
advance should a major financial institution encounter difficulties (Economic and Financial
Committee, 2001). Such efforts do not require a significant reorganisation of the institutional
arrangements governing the prudential policies of the EU and the euro area.66 FSR • The Eurosystem, the euro area and financial stability  • November 2002
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